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Abstract Specialized production tasks are often performed by laborers equipped
with the same technical capabilities to accomplish other tasks equally well. I
demonstrate how production among laborers given identical technology with
no comparative advantage leads to a complete specialization of different tasks.
The switch cost between production tasks is formalized to show how the divi-
sion of labor maximizes the output with the same technology among laborers.
The degree of specialization is limited by the cost of switching among tasks.
The improvement of technology in production that reduces switch cost makes
workers or firms choose not to specialize in tasks.
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1 Introduction
A coffee store like Starbucks often trains the workers to be able to perform
all tasks. However, each worker is assigned to specialize only on one task at
a time. For example, one worker takes the orders and another one makes
the drink. Could there be specialization if all laborers have no comparative
advantage? This article contributes to the literature by showing that workers
who have no comparative advantage choose to completely specialize on one
task and the production becomes more efficient. This article formalizes the
idea of switch cost, which is often recognized as a cost to adapt to a different
task or as the degree of cognitive flexibility in industrial organization in the
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2field of psychology. The idea of specialization is to minimize or avoid the switch
cost. Smith (1776) proposes the idea of specialization within a pin factory
that production would become more efficient when the laborers engaged in
specialization. Often the knowledge and technical capabilities in a standardized
production among the laborers are simple and often costless to acquire them.
Even though those workers can perform all simple tasks within the production,
they are all assigned to perform on a specific task at a given time. This paper
studies the decision-theoretic foundation of tasks organization by establishing
the condition for strategic interactions.
Some studies show that different comparative advantage among workers
that leads to specialization like Stilger (1951), Roy (1951), Rosen (1978), and
Kim (1989). Other studies like Becker and Murphy (1993), Garicano (2000),
Hart and Moore (2005), and Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2008) show
coordination cost is one of the determining factor and extent of specialization.
This article complements the past literature because it provides a formal il-
lustration on immediately intuitive findings of the cause of division of labor
with identical technology. When there is an improvement in technology that
reduces switch cost, the production in firms become less specialized.
2 A Simple Case
Suppose two workers need to perform two complementary tasks, x1 and x2, to
complete a production of a good. The two tasks can be viewed as two types of
goods that need to be completed to satisfy a production preference. A strictly
convex production preference is assumed that there is no perfect substitution
because both tasks are required to complete a good. The production incurs
a switch cost, c > 0, when a worker switches between tasks and spent the
resource to adapt for the new task. For illustration purposes, let’s assume the
time is the resource constraint faced by the workers.
Without loss of generality, the required time to perform each task is nor-
malized to 1. Each worker faces with an identical resource constraint, t =
min{x1, αx1 + (1 − α)x2 − c, x2} and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, which can be illustrated
as the convex production possibilities frontier in solid red line shown in the
Figure 1 and 2. Given a strictly convex production preference function, firms
maximize the output y(x1, x2) subject to the constraint t(x1, x2).
If they choose to generalize and perform both tasks, they would incur a
switch cost. Let a = αxA1 + (1− α)xA2 − c and each worker produces y (a) for
a strictly convex production preference function.
If they choose to divide the labor and specialize only on one task, no
switch cost is incurred. Then both workers specialize to produce at xA1 and x
A
2
respectively. Let a′ = αxA1 + (1 − α)xA2 . The average output for division of
labor is y (a′). Since a′ > a, it implies that
y (a′) > y (a) (1)
3Fig. 1 A convex production possibilities frontier shows an increase in output before (in red
line) and after (in blue line) specialization.
Fig. 2 A convex production possibilities frontier shows a decrease in cost before (in red
line) and after (in blue line) specialization.
4Proposition 1 Specialization in the division of labor increases output if there
exists a switch cost between tasks.
When a firm produces at a fixed level of output, the objective of a firm is to
minimize the cost t(x1, x2) subject to the constraint y(x1, x2). If they divide
the labor and have the workers specialize on one task to produce the same
output level, no switch cost is incurred. Suppose x′1 = x1− c and x′2 = x2− c,
then t′ = min{x′1, αx′1 + (1 − α)x′2 − c, x′2}. Then both workers specialize to
produce at x′1 = x
B
1 and x
′
2 = x
B
2 respectively. With the division of labor,
both workers produce an average output level such that y(α(xA1 − c) + (1 −
α)(xA1 − c)) = y (a). Since c > 0, it implies that
t′ < t. (2)
Proposition 2 Specialization in division of labor reduces cost if there exists
a switch cost between tasks.
3 A General Case
In this section, I illustrate a general case with n complementary tasks and n
workers with identical technical capabilities. y (x) represent a strictly convex
production function with x representing n-vector of tasks. The objective of a
firm is to maximize the output y (x) subject to the resource constraint t (x).
The resource constraint, t = min{(n − 1)c +
n∑
i=1
αixi, x1, x2, ..., xn} for each
worker is identical where
n∑
i=1
αi = 1.
If the workers choose to generalize their production that each worker per-
forms all tasks, each worker incurs a switch cost, (n− 1)c. Let a = (n− 1)c+
n∑
i=1
αixi and each worker produces y (a).
If the workers choose to completely specialize so that each worker performs
only one task, then every worker produces at xAand no switch cost incurs.
The average output per worker is y (a′) where a′ =
n∑
i=1
αixi. Since a
′ > a, this
implies
y (a′) > y (a) . (3)
This proof above reaffirms Proposition 1 for the general case of division of
labor.
Suppose only some m tasks are generalized and the remaining n−m tasks
are specialized. Then, the average output is y (a′′) where a′′ = (n−m− 1)c+
n−m∑
i=1
αixi+
n∑
i=n−m+1
αixi. Since a
′ > a′′, this implies that y (a′) > y (a′′). Thus,
some degree of specialization of tasks is not the most efficient way to organize
a production, either maximizing output or minimizing cost.
5Similarly, the proof for the general case for Proposition 2 is straightforward,
thus is not shown here. A full complete specialization in a division of labor is
the most efficient arrangement of production.
4 A Case with Increasing Opportunity Costs
Given the production technology with an increasing opportunity cost where
the production possibilities frontier bows out, there is a combination of mixing
tasks that yields a higher output than producing more of one task in favor of
another task. In relation to a typical Ricardian or Heckscher-Ohlin model,
some partial specialization is optimal and never a complete specialization.
This section shows a complete specialization is optimal and preferred for a
technology with an increasing opportunity cost when a large switch cost is
present.
Let y (a) be the most efficient production for a technology with an increas-
ing opportunity cost. Each worker faces with an identical resource constraint,
t = min{x1, f(x1, x2) − c, x2} and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, where f(x1, x2) is a concave
function in x1 and x2 and is illustrated as the production possibilities frontier
in solid red line shown in the Figure 3. The value for f(x1, x2) at the axis is
x0. Suppose it is the most efficient production at a when one worker produces
two tasks. A tangent at a is defined such that f (a) +∂af ′ (a) ≥ f(x1, x2). Let
the intercept for the tangent at a to be xc1 and x
c
2 for both axis respectively. So,
y (a) = y(αxc1+(1−α)xc2). Workers choose to specialize if y (a′) > y (a). Then
αxA1 + (1 − α)xA2 > αxc1 + (1 − α)xc2 becomes α(c + x01) + (1 − α)(c + x02) >
α(xc1+x
0
1−x01)+(1−α)(xc2+x01−x01) by substituting x0 into the equation, and
can be further simplified to c > α(xc1−x01)+(1−α)(xc2−x02). The organization
of workers are more efficient when they specialize at xA1 and x
A
2 if and only if
c > xc − x0. (4)
Workers choose to specialize when the cost of switching between tasks
outweighs the benefit of completing multi-task by a person due to increasing
opportunity cost. Instead of choosing to mix the tasks when the technology
is a concave function, workers are more efficient with division of labor if the
switch cost is sufficiently large. Conventionally, workers always choose partial
specialization when the technology is a concave function. This result presents a
different insight that workers can be more efficient with complete specialization
when the technology is a concave function.
Conversely, workers choose to not specialize in tasks when the switch cost
becomes low such that c < xc − x0. We often observe that a workers tend
to perform more tasks when there is an improvement of technology in a pro-
duction that reduces switch costs among tasks for workers. So, the degree of
specialization is also limited by the cost of switching among tasks. The find-
ing is counterintuitive that the improvement in technology always results in
more specialization. When most tasks have an increasing opportunity cost, the
higher switch cost, the higher the degree of specialization. It shows that the
6Fig. 3 A production possibilities frontier with an increasing opportunity cost shows an
increase in output before (in red line) and after (in blue line) specialization.
improvement in technology leads workers to become less specialized when the
new technology reduces the switch cost to be sufficiently small.
5 Conclusion
The time spent to adapt for switching to a new task imposes a cost in the
efficiency of a production. Even the production technology for all the workers
is the same, specialization in the division of labor can avoid the switch cost
between tasks to increase the efficiency in a production. The results can be
extended to trade models where complete specialization among countries is
possible even with increasing opportunity costs.
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